Review Petition in the Supreme Court of India: Article 137, Order XLVII, Grounds, Procedure & Landmark Cases

Law, Practice, Order XLVII, Landmark Jurisprudence, and the Art of Persuading the Same Bench Twice — A Practitioner’s Account

1. Introduction: Why Review Matters

There is a peculiar loneliness in filing a review petition. You are asking the very judges who decided against your client to reconsider their own reasoning – to admit, in effect, that something went wrong. In over a decade of practice as an Advocate before the Supreme Court, I have come to regard the review petition as one of the most misunderstood and yet most vital remedies in our constitutional architecture. It is misunderstood because litigants and even some practitioners treat it as a second appeal. It is vital because, without it, the finality of a Supreme Court judgment would be absolute – and absolute finality, as our constitutional framers understood, is a dangerous thing when it shelters error.

Article 137 of the Constitution provides, in deceptively simple language, that “subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145, the Supreme Court shall have power to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it.”^[1] This provision was not part of the original Draft Constitution of 1948. It was introduced by an amendment moved by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee during the Constituent Assembly debates on 6th June 1949, reflecting a recognition that even the highest court must possess the humility and the mechanism to correct itself.^[2]

In essence a review petition can be filed against any judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court irrespective of whether it was passed in Special Leave Petition, appeal, statutory appeal, writ petition, reference, advisory or transfer petition.

The procedural framework governing this power is contained in Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, which I shall examine in detail. But first, a word about what this article attempts. I write not merely to restate the law, any textbook can do that, but to offer the perspective of a practitioner who has drafted some review petitions, and noticed most of them being dismissed by circulation within weeks. The aim is to lay bare the principles, the pitfalls, and the best practices so that the practitioner or litigant who picks up this remedy does so with clear eyes about what it can and cannot achieve.

2. The Constitutional and Statutory Framework

2.1 Article 137: The Source of Power

Article 137 is the sole constitutional provision that vests the Supreme Court with the power of self-correction through review. It is a derivative power – not inherent, as the Supreme Court itself clarified in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844, where the Court held that the power of review is not an inherent power but must be conferred by law, either specifically or by necessary implication.^[3] This is a critical distinction. Unlike the curative petition, which draws from the inherent jurisdiction under Articles 129 and 142, the review petition is a creature of the Constitution and the Rules made thereunder.

Article 145(e) of the Constitution authorises the Supreme Court to make rules “as to the conditions subject to which any judgment pronounced or order made by it may be reviewed.”^[4] In exercise of this power, the Court framed Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, which remains the governing procedural framework.

2.2 Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013: The Complete Bare Text

2.3 The Civil Procedure Code Connection

Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the SC Rules explicitly borrows its grounds for civil proceedings from Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (ref. sec 114). That provision permits review on three grounds:

(a) the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him when the decree was passed;

(b) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or

(c) for any other sufficient reason.^[6]

These three limbs, as I shall discuss, have been the subject of extensive judicial interpretation.

3. How Review Is Different from Appeal

This is, perhaps, the single most important thing I tell young associates who draft their first review petition: a review petition is not an appeal in disguise. The Supreme Court has said this so many times that it has almost become a mantra, yet the lesson continues to be lost on practitioners who file reviews as though they were seeking a complete rehearing of the case.

In Patel Narshi Thakershi (1971) (supra), the Court held unequivocally that “the power of review is not an inherent power” and that “the review is also not an appeal in disguise.”^[7] In Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1980) 2 SCC 167, the Court elaborated that “a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. Normally, the principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.”^[8]

The distinction, as I understand it from years of practice, is this: an appeal asks the higher court to examine the correctness of the lower court’s decision on facts and law, with a wide latitude to re-appreciate evidence, re-examine legal reasoning, and substitute its own view. A review, by contrast, asks the same court to look at its own judgment with a narrow lens – confined to patent errors, overlooked evidence, or violations of natural justice. You are not telling the Hon’ble judges they were wrong on the merits; you are telling them that an error crept in that they themselves would wish to correct once their attention is drawn to it.

In Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224, the Court distilled this principle with characteristic precision: “the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view.”^[9] And in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd., (2013) 8 SCC 337, the Court laid down nine principles governing review, emphasising that “a review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error” and that “the mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.”^[10]

4. Grounds for Review: Civil and Criminal Proceedings Compared

4.1 Review in Civil Proceedings

In civil matters, Order XLVII Rule 1 of the SC Rules imports the grounds from Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC. These are:

(a) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence: The evidence must be “new” in the sense that it was not available at the time of the original hearing despite the exercise of due diligence. I have seen review petitions fail because the “new evidence” was something the petitioner could have produced earlier with reasonable effort. The Court applies the due diligence requirement strictly.^[11]

(b) Error apparent on the face of the record: This is the most commonly invoked ground, and also the most commonly misunderstood. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (1964) 5 SCR 174, the Supreme Court drew a critical distinction between “a mere erroneous decision” and “a decision vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record” holding that “a review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.” ^[12] In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715, the Court further clarified that “an error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record.”^[13] This is the standard I tell practitioners to internalise: if you need to argue the point at length, it is probably not “apparent.”

(c) Any other sufficient reason: This residuary ground has been interpreted restrictively. In Chhajju Ram v. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112, the Privy Council held that “sufficient reason” must be a reason analogous to the first two grounds and must be of comparable gravity.^[14] The Supreme Court has consistently followed this approach, declining to expand this limb into a broad equity jurisdiction.

4.2 Review in Criminal Proceedings

Here lies a critical difference that every practitioner must understand. Order XLVII Rule 1 of the SC Rules expressly provides that in criminal proceedings, review is entertained only on the ground of “an error apparent on the face of the record.” The wider grounds available in civil proceedings – new evidence and “any other sufficient reason” – are not available in criminal matters under the Rules.

This restrictive approach has its origin in Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which provides that no court, after it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.^[15] However, the position has been nuanced by the Constitution Bench in P.N. Eswara Iyer v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, (1980) 4 SCC 680, speaking through Hon’ble Justice  V.R. Krishnaiyer held that despite the strictures of the Rules, the Supreme Court’s review power in criminal matters may extend to the same breadth as in civil matters, as the constitutional power under Article 137 is plenary and cannot be circumscribed by the CrPC.^[16]

This tension between Rule and constitutional power was further addressed in the landmark judgment of Mohd. Arif v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, (2014) 9 SCC 737, where a Constitution Bench, by a 4:1 majority, held that review petitions in death sentence cases must be heard in open court with oral arguments – and not merely by circulation. Justice Nariman, writing for the majority, observed that where a person’s life is at stake, the “power of the spoken word” must be given an opportunity, and that oral hearing in death penalty reviews is an integral part of “reasonable procedure” under Article 21.^[17] This decision fundamentally altered the procedural landscape for criminal reviews in capital cases.

5. Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati (2013): The Definitive Codification of Review Principles

If there is one judgment I would ask every young practitioner to read before drafting a review petition, it is Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320, decided on 8th August 2013 by a Bench of Chief Justice P. Sathasivam and Justice Dipak Misra. This decision is, in my experience, the single most comprehensive and authoritative codification of the principles governing when a review will and will not be entertained. I have relied upon it in almost every review petition I have drafted since its pronouncement, and I have seen it cited with approval by the Supreme Court in case after case over the past decade.^[18]

5.1 The Facts

The case arose from the Taj Heritage Corridor Project litigation. The Supreme Court, through a series of orders in the M.C. Mehta v. Union of India proceedings, had directed the CBI to investigate irregularities in the Taj Heritage Corridor Project. CBI registered an FIR under Sections 120-B, 420, 467, 468, and 471 IPC and under the Prevention of Corruption Act against several persons including Ms Mayawati, the then former Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. On the very same day, CBI lodged a second FIR solely against Ms Mayawati under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, alleging disproportionate assets. Ms Mayawati challenged this second FIR by way of a writ petition under Article 32, and the Supreme Court, by order dated 6th July 2012 in Mayawati v. Union of India, (2012) 8 SCC 106, quashed the second FIR, holding that the Court’s earlier orders related only to the Taj Heritage Corridor Project and there was no direction regarding disproportionate assets.^[19]

Kamlesh Verma, who had intervened in the writ petition, filed a review petition seeking review of this order. His counsel, Mr Shanti Bhushan (Senior Advocate), took the Court through the same earlier orders that had been considered and argued in the original hearing, contending that the FIR was lodged under the Court’s directions and hence was valid. In essence, the review petitioner was asking the Court to take a different view of the same material that had already been considered.^[20]

5.2 The Court’s Summary of Principles

In Paragraphs 12 to 20 of the judgment, Chief Justice Sathasivam undertook a comprehensive survey of the entire body of case law on review jurisdiction and distilled the principles into two definitive lists. I reproduce the substance of these principles here because they constitute the practitioner’s essential checklist:

When the review WILL be maintainable:

(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him.

(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record.

(iii) Any other sufficient reason — interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526, to mean a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule.^[21]

When the review will NOT be maintainable:

(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import do not warrant review.

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.

(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must not require a process of reasoning to detect.

(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court; it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.

(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.^[22]

5.3 Why the Review Was Dismissed

Applying these principles, the Court dismissed the review petition. It found that the new counsel for the review petitioner was merely repeating the same arguments and citing the same earlier orders that had been advanced by the then counsel for the CBI as well as the old counsel of the intervener during the original hearing. The Court noted, with characteristic firmness, that the very same contentions had been “dealt with and duly considered at length” in paragraphs 18 to 23 of the order under review. The Court also clarified an important ancillary point: while quashing the disproportionate assets FIR, the Court had not said that CBI lacked the power to investigate disproportionate assets — CBI retained the freedom to proceed independently as per law after obtaining the requisite sanction. Nothing was said or expressed beyond the subject-matter of the Taj Corridor dispute.^[23]

5.4 The Enduring Authority: Cases That Have Followed Kamlesh Verma

What makes Kamlesh Verma indispensable is not merely the elegance of its formulation but the remarkable consistency with which it has been followed, affirmed, and relied upon by the Supreme Court in the decade since its pronouncement. The nine-point negative test has become the standard reference framework whenever the Court examines whether a review petition crosses the threshold of maintainability. Let me note the most significant cases:

Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017) 8 SCC 518 — This was a death penalty review. The Supreme Court affirmed the Kamlesh Verma principles while examining whether the review petitioners had made out any ground for reconsideration of their conviction and sentence. The nine-point test was applied to hold that the review amounted to a rehearing.^[24]

Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 8 SCC 149 — The infamous Nirbhaya gang-rape case. When the convicts filed review petitions against their death sentences, the Supreme Court relied on the Kamlesh Verma framework to evaluate each ground urged. The Court reiterated that review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing, and that re-appreciation of evidence is impermissible on review.^[25]

Vinay Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 8 SCC 186 — Another review arising from the Nirbhaya case, decided on the same date, where the Court affirmed the Kamlesh Verma principles in dismissing the review petition of a co-accused, holding that the grounds urged were a repetition of arguments already considered and rejected.^[26]

Akshay Kumar Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 3 SCC 431 — Yet another Nirbhaya review. The Court relied on the Kamlesh Verma principles to dismiss the review, observing that the petition was an attempt to re-argue the case on merits rather than demonstrate any error apparent on the face of the record.^[27]

Yashwant Sinha v. CBI, (2020) 2 SCC 338 — The Rafale review. The Court considered the Kamlesh Verma principles while examining the review petitions filed against the judgment in the Rafale fighter jet deal case, applying the narrow test of error apparent to assess the grounds urged.^[28]

Mofil Khan v. State of Jharkhand, (2021) 20 SCC 162 — The Court followed the Kamlesh Verma principles in a criminal review, reiterating that minor mistakes of inconsequential import do not furnish a ground for review, and that the appreciation of evidence belongs exclusively to the appellate domain.^[29]

Madhusudhan Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy, (2022) 17 SCC 255 — The Court affirmed the Kamlesh Verma principles in the civil context, applying the nine-point test to dismiss a review that sought to re-open findings of fact already concluded.^[30]

State (NCT of Delhi) v. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd., (2024) 7 SCC 315 — As recently as 2024, the Supreme Court considered the Kamlesh Verma framework while adjudicating a review petition, confirming that this judgment remains the governing authority on the parameters of reviewability.^[31]

The thread running through all these decisions is unmistakable. Whether the case involves a death sentence, a defence procurement controversy, a corruption investigation, or a civil property dispute, the Court turns to Kamlesh Verma as the touchstone. For the practitioner, this means that any review petition that does not squarely address the nine-point negative test risks dismissal on the threshold. I have found it useful, in drafting, to structure the grounds of review as a point-by-point response to the Kamlesh Verma checklist; demonstrating affirmatively that the petition falls within the three positive grounds and does not fall foul of any of the nine negative prohibitions.

6. Cases Where Review Petitions Were Allowed

Successful review petitions before the Supreme Court are extraordinarily rare. By some estimates, fewer than 0.1% of judgments are altered on review. But when the Court does allow a review, the cases tend to be momentous. Let me narrate some of them.

6.1 Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India (2019) — The SC/ST Act Review

The background: In Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 454, a two-judge Bench had issued sweeping directions diluting the protections under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The Court directed that no arrest under the Act could be made without prior approval of the appointing authority (for public servants) or the Superintendent of Police (for others), and that a preliminary inquiry was mandatory before registration of an FIR. The decision provoked widespread public protests. The Union of India filed a review petition.^[32]

The decision: On 1st October 2019, a three-judge Bench comprising Justices Arun Mishra, M.R. Shah, and B.R. Gavai allowed the review and recalled the directions issued in Subhash Kashinath Mahajan. The Court held that the earlier Bench had exceeded its jurisdiction by invoking Article 142 to issue directions that effectively created new procedural prerequisites for arrest and prosecution under the Act—a function that properly belonged to the legislature. The Court noted that Article 142 powers are exercisable only when there is a legislative vacuum, which did not exist here.^[33]

Why allowed: The review succeeded because the Court found that the original directions amounted to judicial legislation, creating fetters on arrest and prosecution that were more onerous than those in the general criminal law, thereby treating members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes unequally. This was a patent error—a transgression of the boundary between judicial and legislative function—which justified recalling the entire set of directions.^[34]

6.2 Medical Council of India v. Christian Medical College (2016/2020) — The NEET Review

The background: On 18th July 2013, a three-judge Division Bench had, by a 2:1 majority, quashed the National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET) for medical admissions, holding it to be unconstitutional. The Government of India filed a review petition. On 11th April 2016, the Supreme Court recalled its 2013 judgment, allowed the review, and permitted the conduct of NEET.^[35]

Why allowed: The Court found that the earlier judgment had proceeded on an erroneous interpretation of the constitutional provisions relating to the Centre’s legislative competence over medical education standards, and that the reasoning involved fundamental errors in the appreciation of the scheme of the relevant legislation. A subsequent five-judge Bench, after a fresh hearing, upheld the validity of NEET in 2020.^[36]

6.3 Rajesh Sharma v. Union of India (2018) — Section 498A IPC Review

The background: In July 2017, a two-judge Bench had issued guidelines restricting immediate arrests under Section 498A of the IPC (dowry harassment), mandating the constitution of family welfare committees and other procedural safeguards. The decision was criticised as diluting protection for women against domestic violence. A review petition was filed.^[37]

The decision: On 14th September 2018, a three-judge Bench comprising CJI Dipak Misra and Justices A.M. Khanwilkar and D.Y. Chandrachud modified the earlier guidelines, observing that it was not for the Court to fill in legislative gaps to prevent misuse of the law—such power belonged to the legislature. The Court allowed the review and set aside the earlier directions regarding the constitution of family welfare committees.^[38]

Why allowed: The Court recognised that its earlier directions had overstepped the judicial function by creating an entirely new procedural mechanism (the family welfare committee) that had no basis in the statute, amounting to judicial legislation.

7. Cases Where Review Petitions Were Denied

7.1 Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association (2019) — The Sabarimala Review

After the landmark 4:1 judgment in September 2018 holding that the exclusion of women from Sabarimala Temple was unconstitutional, over 50 review petitions were filed. On 14th November 2019, the Constitution Bench, by a 3:2 majority, declined to decide the review petitions on their merits and instead kept them pending while referring overarching questions regarding the interplay between religious freedom and gender equality to a larger nine-judge Bench. Justices Nariman and Chandrachud dissented, holding that this referral exceeded the narrow scope of review jurisdiction.^[39] The reviews remain technically undecided, but the Court effectively refused to recall the original judgment.

7.2 The Vodafone Review (2012)

After the Supreme Court held in Vodafone International Holdings v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613 that the Income Tax Department lacked jurisdiction to tax an overseas deal between Vodafone and Hutchison, the Government filed a review petition. The review was dismissed by circulation on 20th March 2012 on the simple ground that the petition disclosed “no merit.”^[40] This is, in fact, the fate of the vast majority of review petitions—dismissed in a laconic order that says nothing more than that the petitioner has failed to make out any ground for review.

7.3 Dismissals on Procedural and Substantive Grounds

In my experience, review petitions are most commonly denied for the following reasons:

(a) Disguised appeal: Where the petition amounts to a rehearing of arguments already considered and rejected. As the Court has held repeatedly, “the mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review.”^[41]

(b) No error apparent: Where the alleged error requires elaborate reasoning to detect, it cannot be characterised as “apparent on the face of the record.” The test laid down in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440, is instructive: an error apparent is a “patent error and not a mere wrong decision.”^[42]

(c) Delay: Filing beyond the 30-day limitation without a satisfactory application for condonation of delay.

(d) Absence of AOR certificate: Failure to accompany the petition with the certificate of the Advocate-on-Record as mandated by Rule 1.

(e) Second review: Rule 5 expressly prohibits a second review petition in the same matter once the first has been disposed of. This bar is absolute.

8. The Procedure: What Actually Happens When You File

Let me demystify the process from a practitioner’s standpoint.

The petition is drafted by the Advocate-on-Record, who must certify that it is the first application for review and is based on grounds admissible under the Rules. It is filed within 30 days of the impugned judgment or order. The petition is then ordinarily circulated—without oral arguments—to the same Bench of judges that delivered the impugned judgment, as far as practicable.^[43]

This is the reality that most practitioners must confront: your review petition will, in all probability, be read and decided by the judges in their chambers, without you having any opportunity to address them orally. The petition is your sole instrument of persuasion. If the Court finds merit, it may either allow the review straightaway or direct notice to the opposite party. If it finds no merit, it dismisses the petition—and that is usually the end of the matter, save for the extraordinary remedy of the curative petition.

The exception, carved out in Mohd. Arif (2014), applies to death penalty cases, where the review must now be heard in open court by a Bench of at least three judges.^[44]

9. Best Practices for Filing and Drafting a Review Petition

Having filed numerous review petitions and studied many more that succeeded or failed, I offer the following guidance from the trenches of practice.

9.1 Honest Self-Assessment: Is This a Review or a Disguised Appeal?

Before putting pen to paper, ask yourself with brutal honesty: am I seeking correction of a patent error, or am I really seeking a rehearing because I disagree with the judgment? If it is the latter, do not file. A review petition that reads as a disguised appeal will be dismissed, and it will exhaust your client’s remedy, making a curative petition even more difficult to sustain. As the Court held in Lily Thomas (2000), review is for “correction of a mistake, not to substitute a view.”^[45]

9.2 Identify the Error with Surgical Precision

The petition must identify the specific paragraph of the impugned judgment that contains the error, and explain why it is “apparent on the face of the record” and not merely a different possible interpretation. If you are relying on new evidence, explain with specificity why it could not have been produced earlier despite due diligence. Generalities will not do; the judges are reading this by circulation and need to see the error immediately.

9.3 The AOR Certificate Is Not a Formality

As an Advocate-on-Record, I take the certification requirement seriously. Rule 1 of Order XLVII requires the AOR to certify that the petition is the first application for review and is based on admissible grounds. This certificate is not a rubber stamp; it is a representation to the Court. Filing a review on unarguable grounds reflects poorly on the AOR’s professional judgment.

9.4 Brevity and Clarity: Write for Judges Reading by Circulation

Remember that your petition will be decided by circulation—not in open court. The judges will read the paper-book alongside scores of other matters. A 50-page review petition defeats itself. The most effective reviews I have seen are between 8 and 15 pages, with the error identified in the first two pages and the legal basis stated with clarity and economy.

9.5 Use the Written Arguments Supplement Strategically

Rule 3 permits the petitioner to supplement the petition with “additional written arguments.” This is an invaluable tool. Use the petition itself to identify the error and state the grounds; use the written arguments to develop the legal reasoning, cite the relevant precedents, and demonstrate why the error is “patent” rather than merely arguable. This two-document strategy allows you to keep the petition crisp while providing the Court with the analytical depth it needs.

9.6 File Within 30 Days — No Exceptions Without Cause

The limitation is 30 days from the date of the judgment or order. If delay is unavoidable, file a separate application for condonation of delay with a full explanation. Unexplained delay is fatal.^[46]

9.7 Distinguish the Grounds in Civil and Criminal Matters

If your review is in a criminal matter, frame the grounds within the narrower standard of “error apparent on the face of the record,” unless you are invoking the broader constitutional power as recognised in P.N. Eswara Iyer (1980). In civil matters, you have the full range of the three limbs under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.^[47]

9.8 Do Not Raise New Grounds Not Taken Earlier

A review petition cannot be used to introduce arguments or grounds that were available but not urged during the original hearing. This is not a fresh innings; it is a correction mechanism. The Court takes a dim view of attempts to smuggle new points through the review route.

9.9 Prepare for the Possibility of Notice and Open Court

If the Court finds prima facie merit, it may direct notice to the opposite party. In rare cases, particularly those involving substantial questions, the Court may order oral hearing. Be prepared for both eventualities with a Senior Advocate briefed and ready, especially in criminal matters involving the death penalty following Mohd. Arif (2014).^[48]

9.10 Know When the Fight Ends

Rule 5 provides that once a review petition is disposed of, no further review shall be entertained. The only remaining remedy is the curative petition under Order XLVIII.^[49] Know this limit. Do not attempt serial reviews; you will only invite costs and censure.

10. The Principles at a Glance: What the Case Law Teaches Us

Across decades of jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has crystallised the following principles governing review. The most authoritative consolidation of these principles is found in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320, which has been affirmed, relied upon, and followed in numerous subsequent decisions including the Nirbhaya reviews and the Rafale review:^[50]

First, the power of review is not inherent; it must be conferred by statute or constitutional provision — Patel Narshi Thakershi (1971).^[51]

Second, review is not an appeal in disguise; it cannot be used for rehearing or for substituting a view — Lily Thomas (2000).^[52]

Third, departure from finality is justified only by circumstances of a substantial and compelling character — Northern India Caterers (1980).^[53]

Fourth, there is a vital distinction between a “mere erroneous decision” and one “vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record” — Thungabhadra Industries (1964).^[54]

Fifth, an error that requires elaborate reasoning to detect is not “apparent” — Parsion Devi (1997).^[55]

Sixth, the mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review — Sandur Manganese (2013).^[56]

Seventh, in death penalty cases, review must be heard in open court with oral arguments by a Bench of at least three judges — Mohd. Arif (2014).^[57]

Eighth, a third party, including a relative, does not have locus standi to maintain a review petition in a criminal appeal, unless specifically aggrieved — Satvir Singh v. Baldeva, (1996) 8 SCC 593.^[58]

Ninth, a review petition is the creation of a statute; the power can be exercised only within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power — Lily Thomas (2000).^[59]

Tenth, if the Court’s attention was not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing, the Court will review its judgment; and the Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done — Northern India Caterers (1980).^[60]

11. Frequently Asked Questions

Q1. What is the constitutional basis for a review petition in the Supreme Court?

Article 137 of the Constitution of India empowers the Supreme Court to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it, subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament and rules framed under Article 145. The procedural framework is contained in Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, and, for civil matters, draws from Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.^[61]

Q2. What are the grounds on which a review petition may be filed in a civil case?

In civil proceedings, review may be sought on three grounds: (a) discovery of new and important matter or evidence not available earlier despite due diligence; (b) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; and (c) any other sufficient reason analogous in gravity to the first two grounds. These are drawn from Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC.^[62]

Q3. What are the grounds for review in criminal proceedings?

Under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, review in criminal proceedings is entertained only on the ground of an “error apparent on the face of the record.” However, the Constitution Bench in P.N. Eswara Iyer (1980) held that the Supreme Court’s constitutional power under Article 137 may extend the grounds to the same breadth as in civil matters.^[63]

Q4. What is the limitation period for filing a review petition?

30 days from the date of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed, as per Order XLVII Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. Delay may be condoned by the Court on a separate application if sufficient cause is shown.^[64]

Q5. Is oral hearing permitted in review petitions?

As a general rule, no. Order XLVII Rule 3 provides that review petitions are disposed of by circulation without oral arguments. The exception, established by the Constitution Bench in Mohd. Arif v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, (2014) 9 SCC 737, mandates oral hearing in open court for review petitions in death penalty cases.^[65]

Q6. Can a review petition be filed by someone who was not a party to the original case?

Yes. Under the CPC and the Supreme Court Rules, “any person aggrieved” by a judgment may seek its review. It is not necessary that only the original parties can file. However, in criminal appeals, a third party’s locus standi is more restricted, as held in Satvir Singh v. Baldeva, (1996) 8 SCC 593.^[66]

Q7. Can a second review petition be filed if the first is dismissed?

No. Order XLVII Rule 5 is categorical: once a review petition is disposed of, no further application for review shall be entertained in the same matter. The only remaining remedy is a curative petition under Order XLVIII, subject to the stringent conditions laid down in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388.^[67]

Q8. How is a review petition different from a curative petition?

A review petition is a statutory remedy under Article 137, filed within 30 days, on grounds of error apparent, new evidence, or sufficient reason. A curative petition is a judicially created remedy under the inherent jurisdiction of Articles 129 and 142, available only after a review has been dismissed, confined to violations of natural justice, apprehension of bias, or abuse of process, and requiring certification by a Senior Advocate.^[68]

Q9. Must the review petition be certified by an Advocate-on-Record?

Yes. Order XLVII Rule 1 mandates that the application for review shall be accompanied by a certificate of the Advocate-on-Record certifying that it is the first application for review and is based on grounds admissible under the Rules. Filing without this certificate will result in the petition being returned with defects by the Registry.^[69]

Q10. What happens if the Court allows the review? Can court fees be refunded?

Yes. Order XLVII Rule 4 provides that where the Court reverses or modifies its former decision on the ground of a mistake of law or fact, it may, in the interests of justice, direct refund of the court fee paid on the review application, in whole or in part. This is a discretionary power and is rarely exercised, but it is a useful provision to invoke when the error was entirely on the Court’s side.^[70]

12. Conclusion

The review petition occupies a paradoxical position in Supreme Court practice. It is, on the one hand, the most routinely filed post-judgment remedy—almost reflexively resorted to by litigants who are unhappy with an adverse order. And yet, it is also one of the most sparingly allowed, with a success rate that I would estimate, from long observation, to be well below one percent. This gap between frequency and success tells us something important: most review petitions should never have been filed.

The remedy exists not for the disappointed litigant but for the genuinely aggrieved one—the party who can point to a patent error on the face of the record, a material piece of evidence that was genuinely unavailable, or a violation of natural justice that vitiated the proceedings. The case law I have discussed in this article—from Patel Narshi Thakershi in 1971, through the definitive codification in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati in 2013, to the SC/ST Act review in 2019—consistently reinforces this narrow but vital scope. The nine-point negative test in Kamlesh Verma, affirmed in cases as momentous as the Nirbhaya death penalty reviews and the Rafale review, has given practitioners a clear and authoritative framework against which to measure every review petition before it is filed.

For the practitioner, the review petition is a test of professional discipline as much as legal acumen. The discipline lies in knowing when not to file, in resisting the client’s understandable desire for one more chance, in being honest about whether the ground is truly “apparent” or merely arguable. And when the review is genuinely warranted—when the error is real, the injustice is palpable, and the law supports reconsideration—the acumen lies in drafting a petition that places the error before the Court with such clarity that the judges, reading by circulation in the quiet of their chambers, are moved to say: yes, this was wrong, and we must put it right.

That is the art of the review petition. It is not the art of the second appeal. It is the art of persuading the same bench, twice.

Endnotes

1. Article 137, Constitution of India. Available at constitutionofindia.net. ↑
2. Constituent Assembly Debates, 6th June 1949 (Amendment moved by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee introducing Article 137). Available at constitutionofindia.net. ↑
3. Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844. Available at indiankanoon.org/doc/515943. ↑
4. Article 145(e), Constitution of India. ↑
5. Order XLVII, Rules 1–5, Supreme Court Rules, 2013. ↑
6. Order XLVII, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Section 114). ↑
7. Patel Narshi Thakershi (1971), supra note 3. ↑
8. Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1980) 2 SCC 167. See also Supreme Court Observer, “Review Petitions in the Supreme Court”. ↑
9. Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224. ↑
10. Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd., (2013) 8 SCC 337. ↑
11. Order XLVII, Rule 1(a), Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. ↑
12. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (1964) 5 SCR 174. ↑
13. Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715. ↑
14. Chhajju Ram v. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112. ↑
15. Section 362, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. ↑
16. P.N. Eswara Iyer v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, (1980) 4 SCC 680. ↑
17. Mohd. Arif @ Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, (2014) 9 SCC 737, Paras 58–63. Available at indiankanoon.org/doc/80457116. ↑
18. Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 782 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 265 : 2013 SCC OnLine SC 714 : AIR 2013 SC 3301. Decided on 8th August 2013 by P. Sathasivam, C.J. and Dipak Misra, J. ↑
19. Mayawati v. Union of India, (2012) 8 SCC 106 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 801. ↑
20. Kamlesh Verma (2013), supra note 18, Paras 7, 22–24. ↑
21. Kamlesh Verma (2013), supra note 18, Paras 12–20; Chhajju Ram v. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112; Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526. ↑
22. Kamlesh Verma (2013), supra note 18, Para 20.2 (items (i) to (ix)), drawing from Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib, (1975) 1 SCC 674; Northern India Caterers (1980), supra note 8; Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India, 1980 Supp SCC 562; Parsion Devi (1997), supra note 13; Lily Thomas (2000), supra note 9; Kerala SEB v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 651; Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 501. ↑
23. Kamlesh Verma (2013), supra note 18, Paras 24–28. ↑
24. Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017) 8 SCC 518 (affirming Kamlesh Verma). ↑
25. Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 8 SCC 149 (relying on Kamlesh Verma). ↑
26. Vinay Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 8 SCC 186 (affirming Kamlesh Verma). ↑
27. Akshay Kumar Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 3 SCC 431 (relying on Kamlesh Verma). ↑
28. Yashwant Sinha v. CBI, (2020) 2 SCC 338 (considering Kamlesh Verma). ↑
29. Mofil Khan v. State of Jharkhand, (2021) 20 SCC 162 (following Kamlesh Verma). ↑
30. Madhusudhan Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy, (2022) 17 SCC 255 (affirming Kamlesh Verma). ↑
31. State (NCT of Delhi) v. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd., (2024) 7 SCC 315 (considering Kamlesh Verma). ↑
32. Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 454. ↑
33. Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India (Review Petition), decided 1st October 2019. See Supreme Court Observer, “Subhash Kashinath Mahajan — Court Recalls its Order”. ↑
34. Ibid. ↑
35. Medical Council of India v. Christian Medical College; the review order of 11th April 2016 recalled the judgment of 18th July 2013 and permitted NEET. ↑
36. The validity of NEET was upheld by a subsequent five-judge Bench. See also Supreme Court Observer, supra note 33, discussing this as an instance of the Court exercising its review power to recall an earlier judgment. ↑
37. Rajesh Sharma v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 541 (original directions). ↑
38. Rajesh Sharma v. Union of India, review decided on 14th September 2018 by CJI Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar, and D.Y. Chandrachud JJ. See Supreme Court Observer, “Review Petitions in the Supreme Court”. ↑
39. Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1461, decided 14th November 2019 (3:2 majority). See Supreme Court Observer, “Sabarimala Review”. ↑
40. Union of India v. Vodafone International Holdings B.V., review dismissed 20th March 2012. ↑
41. Sandur Manganese (2013), supra note 10. ↑
42. T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440; followed in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233. ↑
43. Order XLVII, Rules 2 & 3, Supreme Court Rules, 2013. ↑
44. Mohd. Arif (2014), supra note 17. ↑
45. Lily Thomas (2000), supra note 9. ↑
46. Order XLVII, Rule 2, Supreme Court Rules, 2013; read with Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963. ↑
47. Order XLVII, Rule 1, Supreme Court Rules, 2013; P.N. Eswara Iyer (1980), supra note 16. ↑
48. Mohd. Arif (2014), supra note 17, Para 74. ↑
49. Order XLVII, Rule 5, Supreme Court Rules, 2013; Order XLVIII, Supreme Court Rules, 2013; Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388. ↑
50. Kamlesh Verma (2013), supra note 18, Paras 12–20. ↑
51. Patel Narshi Thakershi (1971), supra note 3. ↑
52. Lily Thomas (2000), supra note 9. ↑
53. Northern India Caterers (1980), supra note 8. ↑
54. Thungabhadra Industries (1964), supra note 12. ↑
55. Parsion Devi (1997), supra note 13. ↑
56. Sandur Manganese (2013), supra note 10. ↑
57. Mohd. Arif (2014), supra note 17. ↑
58. Satvir Singh v. Baldeva, (1996) 8 SCC 593. ↑
59. Lily Thomas (2000), supra note 9. ↑
60. Northern India Caterers (1980), supra note 8. ↑
61. Article 137, Constitution of India; Article 145(e), Constitution of India; Order XLVII, Supreme Court Rules, 2013; Order XLVII Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. ↑
62. Order XLVII, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Section 114). ↑
63. Order XLVII, Rule 1, Supreme Court Rules, 2013; P.N. Eswara Iyer (1980), supra note 16. ↑
64. Order XLVII, Rule 2, Supreme Court Rules, 2013. ↑
65. Order XLVII, Rule 3, Supreme Court Rules, 2013; Mohd. Arif (2014), supra note 17. ↑
66. Section 114, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Satvir Singh (1996), supra note 58. ↑
67. Order XLVII, Rule 5, Supreme Court Rules, 2013; Order XLVIII, Supreme Court Rules, 2013; Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388. ↑
68. Rupa Ashok Hurra (2002), supra note 67; Articles 129 and 142, Constitution of India. ↑
69. Order XLVII, Rule 1, Supreme Court Rules, 2013. ↑
70. Order XLVII, Rule 4, Supreme Court Rules, 2013. ↑