A full bench (3 judges) of the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its order dated 25.10.2021 in Criminal Appeal No. 1393 OF 2011 Ramawatarv State of Madhya Pradesh found it appropriate to invoke our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and quash the criminal proceedings under Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989  to do complete justice where the matter had been settled between the parties, and the Complainant had filed an application for compromise.   Reiterating the same plea,  learned   Counsel for the Appellant canvassed before us that the parties are residents of the same village and there is no existing enmity between them. It was submitted that the parties wished to settle their dispute so that they may continue to have cordial relations.

In the said case conviction was confirmed by the trial and High Court u/s Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. However, the complainant compromised the matter and thus both the parties moved the Hon’ble Supreme Court for quashing of the case.  However, Counsel for the Madhya Pradesh State, without controverting the factum of compromise, vehemently opposed such a recourse. It was contended that there was a concurrent finding of conviction, and no substantial question of law was involved in the present appeal. Referring to the decisions of this Court in the case of Ram Lal & Anr v. State of J&K [(1999) 2 SCC 213], Surendra Nath Mohanty & Anr v. State of Orissa [(1999) 5 SCC 238] and Bankat  &  Anr  v.  State  of  Maharastra [(2005) 1 SCC 343] learned   State   Counsel   submitted   that   the   purported   settlement between the parties is inconsequential as the offence in question is not compoundable   in   terms   of   Section   320   of   the   Code   of   Criminal Procedure,   1973   (in   short   ‘Cr.P.C’).   It   was   thus   argued   that   the present case did not warrant any interference by this Court.

The Court was of the opinion that of the opinion that two questions fall for our consideration in the present appeal. 

1. First,  whether the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution can be invoked for quashing of criminal proceedings arising out of a ‘non­compoundable offence? If yes, then;
2.  whether the power to quash proceedings can be extended to offence arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act?

So far as the first question is concerned, it would be ad rem to outrightly refer to the recent decision of this Court in the case of Ramgopal & Anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012 judgment dated 29.09.2021) , wherein, a division bench of the hon’ble Court was confronted with an identical question. Answering in the affirmative, it has been clarified that the jurisdiction of a Court under   Section   320   Cr.P.C   cannot   be   construed   as  a  proscription against the invocation of inherent powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution nor on the powers of the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It was further held that the touchstone for exercising the extra­ordinary powers under Article 142 or Section 482 Cr.P.C., would be to do complete justice. Therefore, this Court or the High Court, as the case may be, after having given due regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that the victim/complainant has willingly   entered   into   a   settlement/compromise,   can   quash proceedings   in   exercise   of   their   respective  constitutional/inherent powers.

The Hon’ble  Court   in  Ramgopal   (Supra)    further   postulated   that criminal proceedings involving non­heinous offences or offences which are predominantly of a private nature, could be set aside at any stage of   the   proceedings,   including   at   the   appellate   level.   The   Court, however, being conscious of the fact that unscrupulous offenders may attempt to escape their criminal liabilities by securing a compromise through   brute   force,   threats,   bribes,   or   other   such   unethical   and illegal means, cautioned that in cases where a settlement is struck post­conviction, the Courts should,  inter­alia,  carefully examine the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, as well as, the conduct of the accused before and after the incident in question.

The Hon’ble court reiterated Ramgopal case that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind:

1.  Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society;
2.  Seriousness of the injury, if any;
3. Voluntary   nature   of   compromise   between   the accused   and   the   victim;   & 
4. Conduct   of   the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the   purported   offence   and/or   other   relevant considerations.” 

In view of the settled proposition of law, the full affirmed the decision of the division bench of  Court in Ramgopal (Supra) and re­iterated that the powers of the Court   under   Article   142   can   be   invoked   to   quash   a   criminal proceeding   on   the   basis   of   a   voluntary   compromise   between   the complainant/victim and the accused.

Hhowever, the Hon’ble put a further caveat that the powers under Article 142 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are exercisable in post­conviction matters only where an appeal  is pending before one or the other Judicial forum. This is on the premise that an order of conviction does not   attain   finality   till   the   accused   has   exhausted   his/her   legal remedies and the finality is sub­judice before an appellate court. The pendency of legal proceedings, be that may before the final Court, is sine­qua­non  to   involve   the   superior   court’s   plenary   powers   to   do complete justice. Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post the attainment of all legal remedies, the annulment of proceedings on the basis of a compromise would be impermissible. Such an embargo is necessitated   to   prevent   the   accused   from   gaining   an   indefinite leverage, for such a settlement/compromise will always be loaded with lurking suspicion about its bona fide. We have already clarified that the purpose of these extra­ordinary powers is not to incentivise any hollow­hearted agreements between the accused and the victim but todo complete justice by effecting genuine settlement(s).

Even though the powers of this Court under Article 142 are wide and far­reaching, the same cannot be exercised in a vacuum. True it is that ordinary statutes or any restrictions contained therein, cannot be constructed  as  a  limitation  on  the  Court’s  power  to  do  “complete justice”. However, this is not to say that this Court can altogether ignore the statutory provisions or other express prohibitions in law. In fact, the Court is obligated to take note of the relevant laws and will have to regulate the use of its power and discretion accordingly.

The  Supreme  Court   in exercise  of  its  jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice “between   the parties in any cause or matter pending before it”. The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for   itself within   which   to   exercise   those   powers   and ordinarily   it cannot   disregard   a   statutory provision governing a   subject,   except perhaps   to   balance   the equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating parties by “ironing out the creases” in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute­settling. It is well recognised and established that this Court has always been a lawmaker and its role travels beyond merely dispute­settling. It is a   “problem­solver   in  the   nebulous   areas”   (see K. Veeraswami v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subject­matter of a given case cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, while making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot,   in   any   way,   be controlled by   any   statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant   to   be   exercised   when   their   exercise may   come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject.

Ordinarily,   when   dealing with   offences   arising   out   of   special statutes   such   as   the   SC/ST   Act,   the   Court   will be   extremely circumspect  in   its   approach.  The   SC/ST   Act  has  been  specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures,   the   Scheduled   Castes/Scheduled   Tribes   continue   to   be subjected to various atrocities   at the hands of upper­castes. The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin­fold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste­based atrocities.

On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in   question, although   covered   under   the   SC/ST   Act, is   primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed   on   account   of   the   caste   of   the   victim,  or where   the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C.

The legal position as of today stands that the Hon’ble Supreme or Hon’ble High Courts can quash even non-compoundable offences by exercising their inherent powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India or section 482 Cr.P.C. respectively.