Section-296 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Obscene acts and songs – with corresponding and equivalent Section 294 of IPC-Indian Penal Code.

Bare Provisions

Below is the comparative table of sections.

Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023	ndian Penal Code, 1860 (corresponding section)
296. Obscene acts and songs. Whoever, to the annoyance of others,—   (a) does any obscene act in any public place; or   (b) sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place,   shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.	294. Obscene acts and songs.—Whoever, to the annoyance of others,   (a) does any obscene act in any public place, or   (b) sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.

COMMENTARY:

INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 2024, India witnessed a historic transformation in its criminal justice system with the implementation of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which replaced the colonial-era Indian Penal Code, 1860. This legislative reform aimed to modernize and Indianize the criminal law framework while addressing contemporary challenges. Section 296 of the BNS is the successor to Section 294 of the IPC, both provisions targeting obscene acts and utterances in public spaces that cause annoyance to others.

The law on obscenity occupies a unique position in criminal jurisprudence as it seeks to balance the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India with the reasonable restrictions permissible under Article 19(2) in the interests of decency and morality. This article undertakes a scholarly examination of Section 296 BNS and its predecessor, analyzing the statutory provisions, essential ingredients, classification of the offence, and the extensive judicial interpretation by various High Courts and the Supreme Court of India.

Comparative Analysis

The substantive content of Section 296 BNS remains largely identical to Section 294 IPC, maintaining continuity in the law relating to obscene acts and songs. The primary difference lies in the specification of the maximum fine amount—Section 296 BNS explicitly prescribes a maximum fine of one thousand rupees, whereas Section 294 IPC did not specify a maximum limit for the fine. This modification provides greater certainty and uniformity in sentencing.

ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENCE

The offence under Section 296 BNS / Section 294 IPC comprises several essential ingredients, all of which must be established by the prosecution to secure a conviction. These ingredients have been consistently identified and refined through judicial interpretation.

3.1 Obscene Act or Utterance

The first and fundamental ingredient is the commission of an obscene act or the singing, reciting, or uttering of obscene songs, ballads, or words. The provision distinguishes between two categories of conduct:

• Section 296(a): Performance of any obscene act in any public place
• Section 296(b): Singing, reciting, or uttering any obscene song, ballad, or words in or near any public place

Definition of Obscenity:

Neither the IPC nor the BNS defines the term ‘obscene,’ leaving its interpretation to judicial discretion based on contemporary community standards. The Supreme Court of India, in the landmark case of Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra (1965 AIR 881), adopted the Hicklin Test for determining obscenity. According to this test, the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity must be to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication of the sort may fall.

The Court in Ranjit Udeshi held that obscenity is that which tends to arouse feelings of sexual desire or impurity, or which has a tendency to corrupt and deprave minds susceptible to immoral influences. However, the Court also recognized that sex and nudity in art and literature alone cannot be evidence of obscenity, and that the work must be evaluated considering both obscene and non-obscene parts.

3.2 Public Place or Near Public Place

The second essential ingredient requires that the obscene act be committed in a public place, or that obscene words be uttered in or near a public place. The concept of ‘public place’ is central to the application of this provision, as it distinguishes acts that fall within the ambit of criminal law from those that remain in the private sphere.

While neither the IPC nor the BNS defines ‘public place,’ judicial interpretation has established that it refers to any place to which the public has access, including roads, streets, markets, parks, public transport, and other spaces where people generally congregate. The phrase ‘near any public place’ extends the scope of the provision to include acts committed in private locations that are audible or visible from public places.

In Dr. Ramchandran v. Sub-Inspector of Police (2022), the Kerala High Court held that a doctor’s consultation room could not be termed a public place for the purposes of Section 294 IPC, as it is a private space where medical consultations occur in confidence. This decision underscores the importance of distinguishing between truly public spaces and spaces that, while accessible to certain members of the public for specific purposes, retain a degree of privacy.

3.3 Annoyance to Others

The third critical ingredient is that the obscene act or utterance must be ‘to the annoyance of others.’ This element distinguishes the offence from mere obscenity and emphasizes the public nuisance character of the provision. The act must not only be obscene in nature but must also cause actual annoyance, discomfort, or disturbance to others present in the vicinity.

The Supreme Court, in N.S. Madhanagopal v. K. Lalitha (2022 LiveLaw (SC) 844), held that mere utterance of obscene words is not sufficient to constitute the offence under Section 294(b) IPC; there must be further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others. The Court observed that mere abusive, humiliating, or defamatory words by themselves cannot attract an offence under Section 294(b) IPC unless they involve lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings and cause annoyance to others.

The prosecution must establish that the words or acts actually annoyed or disturbed persons present at the scene. In the absence of legal evidence showing that the words uttered by the accused annoyed others, the ingredients of the offence cannot be said to be made out.

3.4 Voluntariness of the Act

The act must be voluntary, meaning that the accused must have intentionally performed the obscene act or uttered the obscene words. However, the provision does not explicitly require proof of specific intent or knowledge of obscenity (mens rea). The Supreme Court in Ranjit Udeshi clarified that Section 292 IPC (dealing with obscene books and materials) does not make knowledge of obscenity an ingredient of the offence, and the same principle applies to Section 294 IPC. The prosecution need only prove the ordinary mens rea in the guilty act—that the accused actually performed the act or uttered the words voluntarily.

Accidental acts or private conversations that are unintentionally heard in public may not constitute offences under this section, as the element of voluntariness and intention to cause annoyance would be absent.

3.5 Specificity of Words or Acts

Courts have consistently held that for a successful prosecution under Section 294(b) IPC, the specific words or phrases alleged to be obscene must be clearly stated in the complaint or First Information Report (FIR). Vague allegations are insufficient to establish the offence. In N.S. Madhanagopal v. K. Lalitha, the Supreme Court noted that none of the records disclosed the alleged words used by the accused, and emphasized that while it may not be a requirement of law to reproduce entire obscene words if lengthy, there must be sufficient specificity in the allegations.

4. CLASSIFICATION OF THE OFFENCE

4.1 Cognizable Offence

Section 296 BNS / Section 294 IPC is classified as a cognizable offence. This means that a police officer has the authority to arrest the accused without a warrant based on direct observation of the offence or upon receiving a credible complaint. The cognizable nature of the offence reflects the legislature’s intent to empower law enforcement authorities to take swift action against conduct that disrupts public decency and causes annoyance to members of the public.

4.2 Bailable Offence

The offence under Section 296 BNS / Section 294 IPC is bailable. An accused person charged with this offence has the right to secure bail as a matter of entitlement under the law. The bailable nature of the offence recognizes its relatively minor severity compared to more serious crimes, as reflected in the maximum punishment of three months’ imprisonment. The accused need not establish exceptional circumstances or satisfy stringent conditions to obtain bail; rather, bail is granted as a matter of course unless there are compelling reasons to deny it.

4.3 Non-Compoundable Offence

Section 296 BNS / Section 294 IPC is classified as a non-compoundable offence. This classification means that once criminal proceedings are initiated, the case cannot be withdrawn or settled privately between the complainant and the accused, even if both parties agree to resolve the matter amicably. The rationale behind this classification is that offences affecting public decency and morality are not merely private wrongs but offences against society at large. The state has an interest in prosecuting such offences to maintain public order and decorum, irrespective of the wishes of individual complainants.

The non-compoundable nature of the offence underscores that the harm caused extends beyond the individual complainant to the broader community, and therefore, the matter cannot be resolved through private settlement without judicial involvement.

4.4 Triable by Any Magistrate

Cases under Section 296 BNS / Section 294 IPC are triable by any Magistrate. This means that the offence can be heard and decided by any Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate, facilitating quicker resolution and disposal of cases. The trial need not be conducted by a Magistrate of a specific class, which enhances the efficiency of the criminal justice system in dealing with these relatively minor offences.

5. PUNISHMENT

The punishment prescribed for an offence under Section 296 BNS / Section 294 IPC reflects the legislature’s intention to balance deterrence with fairness, recognizing the offence’s nature as one affecting public order and decency rather than causing grievous harm. The sentencing options are:

• Imprisonment: Imprisonment of either description (simple or rigorous) for a term which may extend to three months.
• Fine: A fine which may extend to one thousand rupees (under Section 296 BNS); under Section 294 IPC, no maximum limit was specified.
• Both: Imprisonment and fine may be imposed together.

The court has discretion in determining the appropriate sentence based on the facts and circumstances of each case, including the nature and severity of the obscene act, the degree of annoyance caused, the accused’s intent, and any mitigating or aggravating factors.

6. JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

6.1 The Hicklin Test and Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra (1965)

The foundation of Indian obscenity law was laid by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra (1965 AIR 881, 1965 SCR (1) 65). Although this case primarily dealt with Section 292 IPC (sale of obscene books), its principles have been consistently applied to Section 294 IPC as well.

Facts:

Ranjit D. Udeshi was one of four partners of a firm that operated a bookstore called ‘Happy Book Stall’ in Bombay. They were prosecuted under Section 292 IPC for possessing and selling copies of the unexpurgated edition of D.H. Lawrence’s novel Lady Chatterley’s Lover, which was deemed obscene. The accused challenged the constitutionality of Section 292 IPC, arguing that it violated the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Legal Issues:

1. Whether Section 292 IPC violated Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution?
2. What test should be applied to determine obscenity?
3. Whether knowledge of obscenity was required to establish guilt?

Supreme Court Held:

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision by a five-judge Constitution Bench, upheld the constitutionality of Section 292 IPC. The Court held that the provision fell within the permissible restrictions under Article 19(2), which allows the state to impose reasonable limitations on free speech in the interests of decency or morality. The Court emphasized that obscenity, defined as material that tends to deprave and corrupt susceptible minds, was not protected speech under Article 19(1)(a).

The Court adopted the Hicklin Test from the English case Regina v. Hicklin (1868), which held that the test of obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences. The Court stated:

“The test does not offend Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. In judging a work, stress should not be laid upon a word here and a word there, or a passage here and a passage there. Though the work as a whole must be considered, the obscene matter must be considered by itself and separately to find out whether it is so gross and its obscenity so decided that it is likely to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to influences of this sort.”

The Court also introduced modifications to the Hicklin Test:

• Sex and nudity in art and literature alone cannot be evidence of obscenity.
• The work must be evaluated considering both obscene and non-obscene parts.
• Publication for the public good can be a defense against the charge of obscenity.

Regarding the requirement of knowledge, the Court held that Section 292 IPC does not make the seller’s knowledge of obscenity an ingredient of the offence. However, the prosecution must prove the ordinary mens rea in the guilty act—that the accused actually sold or kept the offending article for sale.

Significance:

The Ranjit Udeshi case established the Hicklin Test as the standard for determining obscenity in India, a precedent that persisted for nearly five decades. The decision profoundly influenced the interpretation of Section 294 IPC and shaped the legal framework for balancing freedom of expression with public morality.

6.2 N.S. Madhanagopal v. K. Lalitha (2022) – Essential Requirements of Section 294 IPC

In N.S. Madhanagopal v. K. Lalitha (Criminal Appeal No. 1759 of 2022, decided on October 10, 2022, reported as 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 844), the Supreme Court delivered a significant judgment clarifying the essential requirements for establishing an offence under Section 294(b) IPC. The bench comprising Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and J.B. Pardiwala set aside the proceedings against the accused, holding that mere abusive, humiliating, or defamatory words do not attract the offence under Section 294(b) IPC.

Facts:

A complaint was lodged by the respondent before the Judicial Magistrate at Alandur, Tamil Nadu, alleging that the appellant (a landowner) had hurled ‘unparliamentary words’ towards the complainant during a dispute regarding society welfare matters. The complaint invoked Sections 294(b) and 341 IPC (obscene words and wrongful restraint). The appellant filed a petition under Section 482 CrPC before the Madras High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, which was dismissed. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Observations:

The Supreme Court noted that all that had been averred in the complaint was that the appellant hurled ‘unparliamentary words’ towards the complainant, without specifying the actual words used. The Court examined the test of obscenity under Section 294(b) IPC and referred to the observations made in P.T. Chacko v. Nainan (1967 KLT 799):

“It has to be noted that in the instance case, the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence under Section 294(b). None of the records disclose the alleged words used by the accused. It may not be the requirement of law to reproduce in all cases the entire obscene words if it is lengthy, but in the instant case, there is hardly anything on record.”

Supreme Court Held:

The Court held that mere abusive, humiliating, or defamatory words by themselves cannot attract an offence under Section 294(b) IPC. To prove the offence, mere utterance of obscene words is not sufficient; there must be further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others. The Court emphasized:

• The test of obscenity under Section 294(b) IPC is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences.
• Words uttered must involve lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings to constitute obscenity.
• The prosecution must establish that the words caused actual annoyance to others, not merely that they were defamatory or abusive.

The Court observed that in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words uttered by the accused annoyed others, it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence under Section 294(b) IPC are made out. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, and the criminal proceedings were quashed.

Significance:

This judgment clarified that not all offensive or abusive language constitutes obscenity under Section 294 IPC. The provision is specifically concerned with words or acts that have a sexual connotation and tend to arouse immoral thoughts, coupled with evidence of annoyance to others. The case serves as an important precedent in preventing misuse of Section 294 IPC against individuals involved in disputes where harsh or unparliamentary language may be used without sexual overtones.

6.3 Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (1996) – Moral Turpitude and Government Service

In Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana and Another (1996 INSC 632), the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a conviction under Section 294 IPC constitutes moral turpitude sufficient to disqualify an individual from government service.

Facts:

Pawan Kumar, employed ad hoc as a Field Worker in Haryana, was convicted under Section 294 IPC for an obscene act in a public place in a summary trial on June 6, 1980. He entered a plea of guilt and was fined Rs. 20. Subsequently, his services were terminated on the ground that the conviction constituted moral turpitude, thereby disqualifying him from government service under the relevant rules.

Supreme Court Held:

The Supreme Court held that Section 294 IPC, in isolation, does not automatically equate to moral turpitude. The Court emphasized the necessity to assess the specific circumstances and societal standards before categorizing an offence as involving moral turpitude. The judgment stated:

“The conviction of the appellant under Section 294 IPC on its own would not involve moral turpitude depriving him of the opportunity to serve the State unless the facts and circumstances, which led to the conviction, disclose such conduct as would involve moral turpitude.”

The Court noted that the Government of Haryana’s policy list of offences deemed to involve moral turpitude did not include Section 294 IPC. Moreover, the minor nature of the offence, reflected in the nominal fine of Rs. 20, did not justify termination of employment. The Court set aside the termination and directed reinstatement of the appellant with back wages.

Significance:

This judgment has far-reaching implications for government employment and the interpretation of moral turpitude. By decoupling minor offences under Section 294 IPC from the stigma of moral turpitude, the Court paved the way for more equitable employment practices and emphasized a nuanced approach that considers the specific facts of each case.

6.4 Dr. Ramchandran v. Sub-Inspector of Police (2022) – Doctor’s Consultation Room Not a Public Place

In Dr. Ramchandran v. Sub-Inspector of Police (2022), the Kerala High Court addressed the applicability of Section 294(b) IPC in the context of a doctor’s consultation room.

Facts:

The accused, a paediatrician, was alleged to have shown obscene actions with his finger and uttered obscene words against the respondent (the mother of his patient) while attending to the respondent’s child in his consultation room. The respondent filed a complaint under Section 294(b) IPC.

Kerala High Court Held:

The High Court held that a doctor’s consultation room cannot be termed a public place or near public place for the purposes of Section 294(b) IPC. The Court reasoned that a consultation room is a private space where medical consultations occur in confidence, and it is not a place to which the general public has free access.

The Court further observed that for words to constitute obscenity under Section 294(b) IPC, they must arouse sexually impure thoughts in the hearer’s mind. The case did not allege that the petitioner’s words aroused such thoughts. Accordingly, the necessary ingredients of Section 294(b) IPC were not fulfilled, and the proceedings were quashed.

Significance:

This judgment underscores the importance of the ‘public place’ requirement in Section 294 IPC and clarifies that not all spaces accessible to individuals for specific purposes qualify as public places. It protects professionals from potential misuse of the provision in contexts where privacy and confidentiality are paramount.

6.5 Other Significant High Court Decisions

6.5.1 Prabhakran V.V. v. State of Kerala (2022)

The Kerala High Court held that unless words can arouse sexually impure thoughts in the hearer, the offence under Section 294 IPC would not be attracted. The Court quashed proceedings where the accused had used abusive words that did not have sexual connotations.

6.5.2 James Jose v. State of Kerala (Kerala High Court)

The Court emphasized that for a successful prosecution under Section 294(b) IPC, two particulars must be proved: (i) the offender has done any obscene act in any public place or sung, recited, or uttered any obscene song, ballad, or words in or near any public place; and (ii) such act or words were to the annoyance of others.

6.5.3 Lalit Nandlal Bais v. State of Maharashtra (2023)

The Bombay High Court observed that the Indian Penal Code does not define ‘public place,’ and the term must be understood as any place to which the public generally has access. The Court also noted that an act or words must be of such a nature that they offend public decency to attract Section 294 IPC.

7. DISTINCTION FROM RELATED PROVISIONS

While Section 296 BNS / Section 294 IPC deals with obscene acts and songs in public, it is important to distinguish this provision from other related offences under Indian law:

7.1 Section 294 BNS / Section 292 IPC (Sale of Obscene Materials)

Section 292 IPC (now Section 294 BNS) deals with the sale, advertisement, and public display of obscene material, including books, pamphlets, papers, drawings, paintings, representations, figures, or any other obscene object. Unlike Section 294 IPC, which focuses on acts or utterances in public that cause annoyance, Section 292 IPC criminalizes the distribution and possession for sale of obscene materials, irrespective of whether they cause immediate annoyance to others.

7.2 Section 295 BNS / Section 509 IPC (Insulting Modesty of Women)

Section 509 IPC deals specifically with acts or words intended to insult the modesty of a woman. While there may be overlap in cases involving obscene utterances directed at women, Section 509 IPC is a specific provision protecting women’s dignity, whereas Section 294 IPC is a general provision protecting public decency.

7.3 Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000

Section 67 of the IT Act deals with the publication or transmission of obscene material in electronic form. This provision addresses the digital dimension of obscenity and is distinct from Section 294 IPC, which focuses on physical acts and utterances in public spaces.

8. DEFENSES AND EXCEPTIONS

While Section 296 BNS / Section 294 IPC does not explicitly provide for defenses or exceptions, judicial interpretation has identified certain circumstances where the offence may not be made out:

8.1 Lack of Obscenity

If the words or acts in question do not meet the test of obscenity—that is, they do not have a tendency to deprave and corrupt or arouse sexually impure thoughts—the offence cannot be established. Mere abusive, defamatory, or unparliamentary language without sexual connotations does not constitute obscenity.

8.2 Absence of Public Place

If the act or utterance occurred in a purely private space and was not audible or visible from a public place, the offence under Section 296 BNS / Section 294 IPC cannot be made out, as the provision specifically requires the act to be in or near a public place.

8.3 No Annoyance to Others

Even if the act or words are obscene and occur in a public place, if there is no evidence that they caused annoyance to others present, the offence is not complete. The prosecution must establish that the act was to the annoyance of others.

8.4 Artistic or Literary Merit

In cases involving artistic expression, literature, or performance, courts may consider whether the work has preponderating artistic or literary merit such that any obscene elements are incidental or insignificant. The Supreme Court in Ranjit Udeshi recognized that where obscenity and art are mixed, art must so preponderate as to throw the obscenity into a shadow, or the obscenity must be so trivial and insignificant that it can have no effect and may be overlooked.

9. CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES

9.1 Vagueness and Subjectivity

One of the major criticisms of Section 296 BNS / Section 294 IPC is the vagueness of the term ‘obscenity.’ The provision does not define what constitutes obscenity, leaving its interpretation to the subjective assessment of courts based on contemporary community standards. This subjectivity can lead to inconsistent application and potential misuse of the provision.

9.2 Evolving Social Norms

What is considered obscene has changed significantly over time with evolving social norms and cultural practices. Acts or expressions once deemed indecent may now be accepted as forms of personal freedom or artistic representation. The law must be applied in the context of contemporary societal values rather than rigid historical standards.

9.3 Potential for Misuse

Section 294 IPC has been misused in some cases where acts of personal expression, consensual behavior, or artistic representation have been labeled as obscene. This raises concerns about the provision being used to curb individual freedoms and settle personal disputes. The requirement that specific words or acts must be alleged and that they must involve sexual connotations helps mitigate misuse, but vigilance remains necessary.

9.4 Balance Between Freedom of Expression and Public Morality

The provision seeks to balance the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) with the state’s interest in maintaining public decency and morality under Article 19(2). The judiciary has played a crucial role in maintaining this balance, emphasizing that restrictions must be reasonable and narrowly tailored to protect legitimate state interests without unduly infringing on individual rights.

10. CONCLUSION

Section 296 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and its predecessor Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, represent the legislature’s effort to safeguard public decency and morality by penalizing obscene acts and utterances in public spaces. The provisions reflect a delicate balance between protecting society from conduct that offends public sensibilities and respecting individual freedoms, particularly the right to freedom of speech and expression.

The jurisprudence developed by the Supreme Court and various High Courts has significantly shaped the interpretation and application of these provisions. The Ranjit Udeshi case laid the foundation by adopting the Hicklin Test and establishing that obscenity must tend to deprave and corrupt susceptible minds. Subsequent cases like N.S. Madhanagopal v. K. Lalitha clarified that not all offensive language constitutes obscenity—words must have lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts and must cause actual annoyance to others.

The essential ingredients of the offence—obscene act or utterance, occurrence in or near a public place, annoyance to others, and voluntariness—must all be established by the prosecution. The classification of the offence as cognizable, bailable, and non-compoundable reflects its character as a relatively minor offence against public order that nonetheless warrants state intervention.

As society continues to evolve, the challenge for the judiciary and legislature is to ensure that the law remains responsive to contemporary norms while safeguarding the core values of decency and respect in public discourse. The transition from the IPC to the BNS represents an opportunity to reassess and refine these provisions in light of modern challenges, including the digital dissemination of content and changing cultural attitudes toward expression and morality.

Ultimately, Section 296 BNS serves as an important tool for maintaining public order and decency, but its application must be judicious, evidence-based, and sensitive to the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution of India. The rich body of case law provides valuable guidance for courts, practitioners, and law enforcement agencies in navigating the complex interplay between freedom, morality, and law.

FAQs

1. What is Section 296 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita?

Section 296 BNS penalizes obscene acts or obscene songs/words done in or near a public place to the annoyance of others.

2. What is the equivalent section of Section 296 BNS under the IPC?

The equivalent provision is Section 294 IPC, which similarly punishes obscene acts and songs in public places.

3. Is Section 296 BNS a cognizable offence?

Yes, Section 296 BNS is a cognizable offence where police can arrest without warrant.

4. Is Section 296 BNS a bailable offence?

Yes, the offence is bailable and the accused has a right to bail.

5. What is the punishment under Section 296 BNS?

The punishment is imprisonment up to three months, or a fine up to ₹1,000, or both.

6. Does the act need to cause annoyance to others for Section 296 BNS to apply?

Yes, annoyance to others is an essential ingredient of the offence.

7. What constitutes a “public place” under Section 296 BNS?

A public place means any location where the public has access, such as streets, markets, parks, buses, or stations.

8. Are abusive words without sexual content punishable under Section 296 BNS?

No, only words with lascivious or sexually impure elements may attract the offence.

9. Does the prosecution need to quote the actual obscene words used?

Yes, courts require specific obscene words or acts to be clearly mentioned for the offence to be made out.

10. Is the offence under Section 296 BNS compoundable?

No, the offence is non-compoundable and cannot be privately settled between parties.

11. CASE LAW CITATIONS

Supreme Court of India

• Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, 1965 AIR 881, 1965 SCR (1) 65
• N.S. Madhanagopal & Anr. v. K. Lalitha, Criminal Appeal No. 1759 of 2022, (2022) 17 SCC 818, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 844
• Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana and Another, 1996 INSC 632, AIR 1996 SC 1356
• State of Haryana v. Ved Kaur, (2017) 4 SCC 493
• Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, (2014) 4 SCC 257

High Courts

• Dr. Ramchandran v. Sub-Inspector of Police, Kerala High Court (2022)
• Prabhakran V.V. v. State of Kerala, Kerala High Court (2022)
• James Jose v. State of Kerala, Kerala High Court
• Lalit Nandlal Bais v. State of Maharashtra, Bombay High Court (2023)
• P.T. Chacko v. Nainan, 1967 KLT 799, Kerala High Court
• K.P. Aliyar v. State of Kerala, Kerala High Court (2024)
• Prafulla Kumar Jaiswal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh High Court

Foreign Precedents

1. Regina v. Hicklin, (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (English Case)
2. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (US Supreme Court)
3. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (US Supreme Court)